A considertation of cost-benefit analysis in the context of public policy decision-making by Wong, Kathleen M
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses Student Research
Fall 1988
A considertation of cost-benefit analysis in the
context of public policy decision-making
Kathleen M. Wong
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wong, Kathleen M., "A considertation of cost-benefit analysis in the context of public policy decision-making" (1988). Honors Theses.
Paper 754.
URURURURURURURURURURU 
UR UR UR URUR 
UR UR UR UR URU 
UR UR UR UR URU 
UR UR UR URUR 
UR UR UR URU URU 
UR UR UR URUR UR 
UR UR URURU U 
URURURURURURURURURURU 
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND liBRARIESr.: 11//j/~~~~m~~~~mlllllmllllmll 
3 3082 01 028 2258 
Dr. Joseph Keiser, Chair 
Departmental Honors Committee 
Gotwald Science Center 
The University of Richmond 
Dear Joe: 
~.lu~-g 
lUBlL(J 
Kathleen Wong has completed her honors program in philosophy 
and should be certified to receive departmental honors when 
she graduates this May. 
Enclosed is a copy of her honors thesis. 
Cordi a 1 1 >' ~ 
~-----------
Thomas Professor of Philosophy 
13 March 1989 
enclosure 
DEPARlHENT OF PHILOSOPHY I <804) 289-8422 I THE ltHVERSITY OF RICifi!JlD, VIRGINIA I 23173 
Deborrah Dunne <Toronto) I James Hall <Chapel Hill)/ Neale Mucklow (Cornell> I Lorenzo Sinpson <Yale) 
A Consideration of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In the Context of Public Policy Decision-Making 
Philosophy Honors: Senior Thesis 
Kathleen M. Wong 
under the mentorship of 
James H. Hall, Chair 
University of Richmond, Virginia 
Fall, 1988 
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Just what is to be understood by the term "cost-benefit analysis"? 
Starting with the history of use in United States public policy 
decision-making, a skeleton is presented, building on the concept of 
economic welfare. 
EXPOSITION 
The setting and service of cost benefit analysis is discussed. 
THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS MACHINE 
The conduct of a cost-benefit analysis is divided into a series of 
processes, which could be described as mechanical functions. 
PUBLIC POLICY APPLICATION 
The reasons for use of cost-benefit analysis in public policy 
decision-making are discussed. A private, profit-oriented firm seeks to 
maximize net revenue, while the government is concerned with the 
maximization of "social benefit." 
PROBLEMS IN CONDUCTING A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A number of issues are raised concerning the setting and service of 
cost-benefit analysis: challenging the "ideal" market conditions factor 
(specifically, the recognized lack thereof), e}:ploring the question of 
conflict-of-interest with respect to the relationship between the 
decision-maker and the analyst, considering the difficulty of satisfying 
the full information requirement, touching the primary problem of 
identifying objectives. 
CRITICISMS 
The relation of cost-benefit analysis to utilitarianism is 
recognized. Several standard criticisms of utilitarianism are introduced 
and rephrased for application to cost-benefit analysis. Nominally, these 
include: bias, identification of costs and benefits, measurability, 
dish'ibution, minority rights, uncertainty, and time. The discussion 
serves additionally to augment the understanding of the process of 
cost-benefit analysis. 
In a second line of argumentation, the problem of government action 
is explicated. Unintentional indirect (as •.11ell as intentional direct) 
effects on the financial markets and the system of the economy resulting 
from public policy decisions necessitate attention. 
RESPONSE 
The criticisms are addressed. The tenor of the response is less 
that of rebuttal to the arguments and more in general support of the use 
of the process of cost-benefit analysis. 
CONCLUDING COMt1ENTS 
Notes from unrelated fields are presented in defense of the 
arguments about cost-benefit analysis, as well as additional unexpressed 
questions. Cost-benefit analysis despite weaknesses appears to stand as a 
valuable and necessary technique, with a place in public policy 
decision-making. 
---------------------------------~ 
INTRODUCTION 
JLtst what is to be understood by the term • cost-benefit anal!:Jsis" 
("benefit-cost analysis")? The question itself arises from a curiosit!:J into 
how government decisions <which affect all) are made. This paper gives an 
elementary discusssion of constitutive parts, raising and responding to some 
initial criticisms. It ~ fairly evident, unneedful of additional 
explanation or elaboration. The individual on the street would simply 
declare that it sounded 1 ike some rather ordinary decision-making process 
which involved the consideration of the costs and benefits incurred by the 
paths of action that might be selected. "Ordinary" means accessible to 
anyone and not the exclusive claim of the degreed economists or the 
governmental guardians; rather, a common-sense listing, accounting, of the 
"pros and cons." This hypothetical individual has grasped the core of the 
matter, but the peripheral understanding is mistaken. 
Cost-benefit analysis appears to have a history similar to those of 
its siblings in economic phenomena: people knew it existed and engaged in it 
previous to its identification and description. The United States 
manifestation of "benefit-cost analysis" (as it is known on this side of the 
At I antic (Campen: 12)), is traced to the River and Harbor Act of 1902 
<Campen: 16). The Flood Control Act of 1936 is more often cited because of 
its wording directing choices such that "the benefits to whomsoever they 
accrue are in excess of estimated costs"(Campen: 16). The problem with this 
high-intentioned phrasing was that an instruction sheet was not enclosed, 
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leaving the agencies to figur•e out to the best of their abilities just what 
was to be understood by the terms. What then happened was reasonable 
behavior on the part of the agencies: they each sought their own 
self-interest, and "benefit-cost studies were intended to justify projects 
that the agencies wanted to undertake rather than designed to provide 
serious, critical analyses of the (project) merits" <Campen: 17). This 
approach, faults noted, will provide a basis for a criticism of cost-benefit 
analysis to be discussed later. 
The question remains. The lay response given above is a solid first 
step. The second steps are as varied in size and direction as are the views, 
kinds, manners, weights, situations, intentions, and applications of 
cost-benefit analysis. Other factors which color "what is to be 
understood ••• " include political inclinations, motives, and the effective 
power of the utilizers. 
A response drawing from the field of the social science of economics 
<although not necessarily the response of an economist) is that it (cost-
benefit analysis) is applied welfare economics <Campen: 16J. The regression 
commences: what is to be understood by "welfare economics"? For starters, 
the term "welfare" in this conte:{t is not what is contemporarily understood. 
Rather, it refers to the "spread" between what the consumer is wi 11 ing to 
spend for a product and the actual price of that product. A simple market 
example of this is the student in desperate need of a writing implement so 
as to take that mid-term, who is ardently willing to pay ten dollars for the 
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article which is rung in the cash register at seventy-nine cents (plus tax). 
The surplus enjoyed by the consumer, the consumer's welfare, is tidily 
quantified at $9.17. And there is a flag on the play-- the next statement 
sounds suspiciously normative for a science -- the consumer is better off 
than if the register had rung up the full sum determined by the consumer's 
willingness. This concept is then extrapolated to the community of 
consumers. At the societal level, the situation bears only slight 
resemblance to the that of the "simple market" -- the evaluation, appraisal 
of the action is in terms of who is to be made better or worse off by the 
choice, and by how much. The society is the recipient of the costs and 
benefits of the course of action, the whole and only reason for conducting 
the analysis. 
The Pandora's box opens and questions flood the lines as· the example 
e:·:Plodes; that is, questions of welfare are globally present. The first 
measure, which serves dually as offensive and defensive, is to establish 
limiting parameters for discussion. The specific application of cost-benefit 
analysis is that which might be described as the setting of an objective; 
selecting a means, a course of action, with an eye to that objective; and 
studying the effects of that course of action. In the realm of public policy 
decision-making, cost-benefit analysis is a technique for comparing 
alternative courses of action, or even between A or not-A. 
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EXPOSITION 
The service of cost-benefit analysis is derived from its setting, 
the economic system of the free marketplace. As described first by Adam 
Smith, the functioning of the ideal free marketplace would result in the 
optimal economic benefit over all. Srrlith posits that the individuals' 
pursuit of their own self-interest results in the the maximization of the 
interest of society as a whole. The model of the ideal free market is 
defined by a number of characteristic conditions in order that it might 
work perfectly to achieve the best economic outcome. 
A> In the market for each good, there are a large number of 
relatively small buyers and sellers. 
B> All firms in the same industry produce similar goods; ••• 
products are completely standardized among firms and 
there is no brand loyalty among consumers. 
C> Resources are completely mobile. Owners of productive 
resources (land, labor, capital) are free to put them 
to whatever use they please •.•. There are no barriers 
to establishing a firm in any industry. 
D> Each economic agent is an optimizer. Each individual 
acts to ma:dmize ••• satisfaction, each firm acts to 
E> 
F> 
maximize its profits. 
Each agent has perfect knowledge, 
certainty all present and future prices. 
There are no price rigidities. Prices may 
down subject to market pressures. <Sassone: 
knows with 
move up or 
56,58) 
d f · · t · be drawn two add1. t ional From this elementary e 1n1 10n can 
descriptive statements: 
Prices are determined by the market equilibration of supply and demand 
in the long run, goods are produced and sold at the lowest possible price 
<Sassone: 57) 
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Given all of the above, then, the market would work perfectly, 
requiring no intervention from without. With participants as free and as 
numerous as described, no one individual's action can change the whale. 
The homogeneity of the product ensures that the demand curve (indicative 
of consumer preference) is uniformly elastic. "Perfect• is understood to 
be the state of all the individuals pursuing their own self-interest and 
being equally satisfied in that pursuit, thanks to the concomitant 
accomplishment of the best interest of the society which the individuals 
comprise. It cannot be too obvious by this paint that such "perfection" 
is not even mostly appro:<imated, and that there is a need for the 
intervention of an outside agency. The question at hand, however, is not 
a criticism of the market system or a political statement supportive of 
government involvement. Rather, a decision is to be made of a course of 
action. It is to be gained from the discussion immediately foregoing that 
a decision in the marketplace will have effects, positive and negative, 
which are to be understood in the cante:<t of the marketplace. To 
make sense of the effects is the purpose of cost-benefit analysis. 
THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS MACHINE 
The imagery of a machine lends to one view held of cost-benefit 
analysis as a "neutral machine" <Campen: 26). Simply speaking, a machine 
would conduct cast-benefit analyses in the fallowing fashion: 
1. A problem or case is rendered by the operator far consideration. 
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2. The operator specifies the objectives of the study, determining what 
is to be maximized. 
3. The objectives are interpreted and contained in a function. 
4. The function is then maximized "given the empirical relations in the 
economy and the institutional constraints that may be appropriate.• 
(Ibid.). 
5. The results are then submitted to the operator as 'input' for the 
decision on the case or problem. 
The initial step needs little additional e:·:plication. The 
difficulties in its execution could be the defining of the problem, 
although the instance of considering between one course of action and 
another seems fairly straightforward. This step is before the threshhold 
to the room housing the cost-benefit analysis machine is even crossed, 
and is all in the hands of the operators. In language of an example, in 
the arena of public policy decision-making, this step is the legislators' 
determining that either policy X or policy Y ought to be implemented to 
deal with the problem of litter in the State Park system. 
The second step is the presentation of the question to the machine. 
The machine, one might say, is sharp but ignorant. Submemory A would 
receive, as the operators intend, the values or variables which are to be 
maximized (or minimized). Submernory B would receive, as the operators 
best understand, a description of that in respect to which the costs and 
benefits are to be analyzed. For subrnemory C, all of the details of the 
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relevant situations would have to be spelled out as e:·:pl ici tly as the 
operators themselves know. Continuing with the e:{ample above, A might 
contain the objectives of conservation and least cost operation. In B 
would be the description of the two policies. The data of C would be all 
manner of general and specific information about the State Park system, 
its concerns, its business, as well as information about the State's 
economy avera 11 • 
The third step introduces the "magic." With the proper amount of 
mathematical wizadry, the software of the machine crunches and chugs on 
the information that was entered into the subroutines to produce an 
algorithm, to build an equation. The function centers on record A; 
garnishes it with data from record B, weighted according to its 
relationship to A; all the while peeking at record C to note if any 
instances of A Cthe concerns to be optimized) will be overlooked. At the 
conclusion of this activity, the machine produces as complete a function 
as could be constructed from the information given. Again, from the 
example, the machine would focus on conservation and least cost 
operation, and consider how the proposals of the respective policies 
affect/effect the objectives, and describe this in mathematical 
relations. The general information file would be surreptitiously 
consulted as a guide in developing the function. 
The fourth step is "merely" the ma:·:imization of the e:{pression 
derived. "Merely" -- what a deceptive little descriptor~ -- includes 
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primarily the application of the function with respect to the information 
in record C, plus all else. The significant difficulty in the operation 
of this step is the problem of quantification. How are the costs, 
benefits, and maximization to be understood? The costs and the benefits 
exist in any of a number of classes: real, pecuniary, direct, indirect, 
secondary, tangible, intangible. (Campen, passim, cf. Ray, Sassone, 
Sugden). In the example, the function would be run with the data of the 
third set C. Perhaps it would be discovered that policy X hypothetically 
boasts of a high conservation value but is proportionally high in price 
Can economic understanding -- as e:·:pected by the establishment of the 
parameter in the second step). Policy Y yields a relatively moderate 
advance in conservation at an equal price. 
The fifth step returns the results of the analysis to the· operator 
"who then somehow corrtbine(s) the information and analysis received .•• 
with other considerations in the final process of reaching a decision." 
(Campen: 25, emphasis added). Here the legislators review the the product 
of the machine, with other considerations. Perhaps both policies fit the 
budget slot available, and the more moderate approach claims adaptability 
for more of the different types of problems (e.g., water recreation areas 
and road sides as well as forested campgrounds). 
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PUBLIC POLICY APPLICATION 
The need for cost-benefit analysis with respect to government 
expenditures is due to the government's not being a profit-oriented firm 
and not having a vested interest in reducing costs or seeking economic 
efficiency. Thus, the government tends to emphasize need and disregard 
cost CMcf\ean: 12>. To restate, the private firm seeks to ma:dmize net 
revenue, profit; whereas the purpose of cost-benefit analysis in public 
policy decision-making is to maximize "social benefit" CMishan: xix). In 
economics there are two curves, one representing all the possible 
combinations of inputs CKapital, Labor) to produce a certain outcome, one 
representing all the possible combinations of inputs at a constant cost. 
The former is labelled the isoquant curve, the latter the isocost. 
Working within income restraints, the private firm moves carefully 
primarily to maximize output at the lowest possible (fixed) cost. 
Governments, on the other hand, tend to have a job that must be done 
(think of a favorite pork-barrel spending item), and cost is "no object." 
PROBLEMS IN CONDUCTING A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Given as simple an understanding of cost-benefit analysis as was 
outlined above, one can now begin to examine the process and its 
assumptions for gaps and problems in the conduct of the technique. For a 
first attack, one might question, for soundness, feasibility, and 
validity, the descriptive conditions of the "ideal" marketplace. The 
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attack is easily phrased: can it exist, does it exist, how close can it 
be approximated, how does the approximation serve as a starting point for 
application, how should the results of the process be understood with 
regard to this fact? 
The ambiguity in the value of the separation of decision-maker and 
the technician of the cost-benefit analysis provides more questions. The 
selection, definition, and description of the problem: How much and what 
sort of responsibility is on the part of the analyst in this initial 
step? The fallibility of the decision-maker, a lack of clarity in the 
communications between the agents could lame the runner on the starting 
block. Conversely, if the technician and the decision-maker were closely 
bound, a possibility for conspiracy or a negative union-of-interests 
might result. This union would be negative in that it e:{isted at the 
expense of the rival, the citizenry or the consuming public. 
In the submission of all the relevant information to the "machine" 
for the cost-benefit analysis lie problems among the most crucial to the 
evaluation of the technique. The neat little word "all" encompasses much 
more that which might at first be listed. "All" is not an insignificant 
amount of information from only a few areas. "Relevant" is also a 
provoker of questions: it may not be possible given the contemporary 
(with the conduct of the analysis) knowledge of the situation to be able 
to predict or even anticipate possible effects or areas of effects of the 
decision. For the process to continue from the information-gathering 
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point, considerations of truth-reflective calculations of price, 
discounting ovet• time, the probability or uncertainty involved in the 
e:-:pectation of the effects, and the quantification of non-economic or 
non-quantifiable costs and benefits in economic terms must be included. 
Primary in the considerations are, of course, the setting and 
understanding of the objectives. Declaration of costs and benefits 
requires more than Just indication of the desirable and the undesirable. 
The role of the politician operator is to select in the interest of the 
constituency, the citizenry in general, and the world at large, a 
hierarchy that is dangerously subject to blindness and bias. Is it beyond 
rational e:<pectations that the local legislator should look at those 
affected outside of the group which is responsible for re-election? 
Determining costs and benefits is ~ than listing "ultimate values" 
<McKean: 26). Secondary are lower level priorities which are objects of 
"suboptimization• <McKean: 30). In the case of a public policy decision, 
the pr imar!;;l objective might be the task to be accompli shed (drug-abuse 
education programs in junior high schools), with the secondary concern of 
reasonable cost. 
1.-, ..:.. 
CRITICISMS 
Cost-benefit analysis is subject to cri ticisrn from many sides. One 
I ine of argument can be drawn from the standard attacks on Bentham-Mi 11 
utilitarianism. Consideration of these criticisms sets the stage for others. 
Below are outlined some of the arguments against utilitarianism in the terms 
of cost-benefit analysis, followed by some responses. The problems that will 
be discussed are: bilateral incidence of bias, identification of costs and 
benefits, measurability, distribution, minority rights, uncertainty, and 
time. 
Cost-benefit analysis cannot claim to be purely technical and free of 
bias. Necessarily the perspective of the decision-maker, and possibly the 
perspective of the analyst will be evident in its formulation. The 
decision-maker (singular or a collective) e}:presses the objectives of the 
course of action under consideration, which are viewed from limited 
horizons, which do not encompass exactly the whole of the universe. In the 
case of a legislative agent, this bias could be a favoritism to a region, 
constituency, or industry. Here is encountered the age-old question of the 
interest of a politician -- is the legislator able to separate, recognize, 
and adopt the interests of the people? What people? Parochialism is possibly 
an instance of limitation, yet to whom, to what community is the legislator 
responsible? It does seem absurd that the good Senator should conduct a 
study of or sLtbmi t an apology to the X industry in M-land because of 
protectionist policies (tariffs, quotas) which are to be implemented 
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domestically. Again, the objectives and interests must be prioritized. If 
M-land is a critical ally, then perhaps the objective of tranquil relations 
ranks higher than the protection of jobs in the good Senator's home State. 
Perhaps not, which is example of the issue at hand. Would a public policy 
choice benefitting a regional segment of the population at the cost of an 
minimal-but-positive increase in threat to the whole of the population be 
wise/ appropriate/ justifiable/ justified? 
Clearly the decision-maker utilizes a judgement in determining the 
objectives of a course of action (or an as-yet-to-be-deve 1 oped course of 
action). The bias is understood as a given, but this does not render it 
safely impervious to criticism. In the political realm, such comments occur 
normally in the language of position (e.g., "left," "right,• "conservative," 
•liberal">. Whether or not these objectives are correct remains an open 
question. Ultimate objectives are not produced de novo; rather, they are 
traditionally described (e.g., in the Constitution) or defined (e.g., in a 
party platform>. The costs and benefits of the course of action under 
consideration are then derived with respect to the stated objective. Because 
of the directness of the relationship, the question of whether the "correct" 
goods are being measured is seated in the construction of objectives and not 
in the conduct of the cost-benefit analysis. The weights accorded the 
respective entities are also drawn from their relation to the objectives. 
For e:-:ample, if the objective is the reduction of fuel dependency, through 
the establishment of bicycle lanes, a benefit would be the reduction of fuel 
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consumption, with the improvement of physical health an achievement en 
route, sa to speak. 
The second area of bias is in the analyst's drawing up of the 
algari thm: the degree at relatedness to the decision-maker. Which is the 
preferred pasi tian: detachedness or involvement? If the analyst is tao 
detached, one might envision missed/ discounted connections, old news, 
surprises, meaninglessness. If the analyst is tao close, a "conflict of 
interests" might e:<hibi t itself in the shifting of weights of casts and 
benefits in order that the desirable result might be produced. The analyst 
needs to have an understanding of the question at hand to make the results 
intelligible to the decision-maker. 
The positional interpretation of evaluator relativity makes the 
truth value at such statements as "this state of affairs is good" 
and "X is a better state of affairs than Y" primitively dependent 
an the pastian occupied by the person making the statement Car by 
the person an whose behalf the statement is made) •.•• 
Why? Because of the evaluator's involvement in the state at 
affairs under consideration. 
<Sen: 114,118) 
Cast-benefit analysis encounters an obstacle in its operation with the 
problem at quantification. Are the benefits il.nd costs measurable? The 
standard method of accounting, of simply adding gains and subtracting lasses 
does nat adequately address the question. As mentioned before, the kinds and 
characteristics at benefits and costs do nat always easily lend themselves 
to dollar sign assignments. Those that do often entail other calculations. 
-
The improvement of physical health above receives a numerical value from the 
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decrease of health benefits insurance companies would pay, for example. The 
effects of a course of action might even remain ungauged and merely be 
listed: "one child per year will die as a result of implementation." The 
value of a benefit or a cost is not even consistent to the individual. 
Consider the economic principle of diminishing marginal utility. This curve 
describes how utility or satisfaction is increased/ affected by the 
acquisition of additional units of the article. The slope initially 
increases and then reaches some point at which it decreases. The concept was 
rather entertainingly illustrated once with the following e:-:ample. At a. 
party, the first glass of wine imbibed imparts pleasure {+3 utils), the 
second raises the enjoyment more {+4 utils), the third is ok <+2 utils), the 
fourth begins to cause drowsiness <121 utils). From this picture, it is 
evident that the value to the individual of a loss might exceed the value of 
a gain {compare the two directions at the point between the second and third 
glasses). The recognized faults of interuti 1 i ty comparison are: that each 
individual has a unique marginal utility curve pattern; that the currently 
held position {along the curve described by the function) of the individual 
cannot be cursorily identified. How should a legislator or decision-maker 
understand this? How can this be taken into consideration when calculating 
costs and benefits? Again, the best interests of the affected parties must 
be considered. 
Assumptions must be made. One imagines that a generalization is 
indulged -- covering a range around the norm of the population distribution. 
This range, this norm, this distri_bution will discount someone's 
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satisfaction. Individuals will be over-satiated (possibly to the point of 
negative and not Just diminishing marginal utility), others will be less 
than satisfied. These in the minority might be addressed with complementing 
policy choices of taxes and subsidies to offset or augment the affects of 
the central course of action. 
Pareto distribution refers to the choice between two parties. Let the 
benefits be distributed such that one of the individuals (also applicable to 
collective entities) believes that her welfare has been increased, let the 
other believe that he, too is better off; or, that his welfare is unchanged; 
or, that he is worse off. The first situation is one of Pareto Superiority, 
the second of Pareto improvement, the third -- to be announced. Introducing 
the willingness to pay criterion complicates the computation. "WTP" refers 
to the optimized amount an individual would pay or receive for the 
individual's change in welfare. A hypothetical Pareto situation is created 
and labelled "Potential Pareto Improvement Criterion." (Campen: 29) The 
question is no longer are all the parties better off or at least not 
diminished in welfare, but 
"by how much does the total sum of money that the gainers from a 
project would be prepared to pay to ensure that the project is 
undertaken exceed the total sum of money that the losers from a 
project would accept as compensation for putting up with it?" 
(Sugden Williams: 94) 
The additional measures of compensation described above are a part of 
the calculations in a deceptive sense. They factor into the consideration 
-- but they do not necessarily have to be e:<ecuted if the project is 
selected. A concern is voiced that the interests of the individuals who 
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repeatedly fall outside of the arbitrarily demarcated region might be 
entirely discounted or consistently ignored -- a clear exploitation of the 
minority. The danger is realistic, thanks to the PPIC, that the "redeeming 
value" of "good intent" supersedes the ability <need) to make good. 
Consequentialist approaches are also criticized for ignoring the 
question of distribution, for being naively oblivious to the present 
di str i but ion of goods and perhaps assuming that all the members affected 
will be equally served or disserved by the course of action. Legislators 
would not fall victim to this sort of blindness; program choice at this 
level take into account the current distribution in part of the 
calculations. In an ideal Paretian fashion, it is expected that legislators 
would seek to maintain the status quo or to contribute to a more equitable 
distribution. The danger (and possibly "necessary evil"?) of the Potential 
Pareto Improvement Criterion is that it would allow the legislator to rest 
easily with whatever had been wrought in the comforting knowledge that the 
short-changed segment of the population could receive its proper allocation 
of benefits, but it there is no requirement that they should. 
In dealing with any expected outcome effects, the solutions are 
subject to the caprices of the future. Very 1 i ttle in this universe is 
neatly, safely predictable. We make our best guesses, and that is all they 
are. The problem of unpredictability has several aspects: (1) that the known 
elements wi 11 not interact as e:<pected (2) to produce <such) that the 
outcome which is e:<pected will not occur (3) as expected (i.e., with a 
---------------------------~-------------------------
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significant!~ different intensity). Probabilit~ is incorporated, with 
1 imi ted efficacy. A completely une:{pected unanticipated event of untold 
proportion and far-reaching repercussions could occur the day after the 
chosen project's operations are inaugurated and render the careful 
measurements, calculations, and predictions invalid. 
Evaluations of costs and benefits includes the factors of probability 
and time. Time refers to when the effects are e:{pected to be experienced. 
Distant effects are reduced by means of the standard financial device of the 
present value formula. The formula takes the expected future value of the 
asset (denominated in money terms) and pulls it forward, discounting the 
value over the "lapsed" time period using a "discount rate• derived from the 
interest rate or real rate of return. A sibling calculation enables the 
comparison of a present good with another at a specifed point in the future. 
A separate line of criticism is taken from elementary macroeconomics. 
Governmental fiscal policy is effective or not, depending on one's 
description <Keynsian or neoclassical or ---> of the relevant curves. The 
problerr, of the "crowding out• effect refers to either the action of the 
government in the place of private interest actions (social security where 
there was private charity), or the usage of financial capital on the part of 
the government in competition with private interest funding. This could be a 
hidden cost not included in the calculations. An additional concern is the 
possibility that such government activity would be countercyclical or 
procycl ical, alleviating or aggravating the current (or future> economic 
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conditions. The problem is not fatal to the undertaking of projects; rather, 
it should be included as an area of incidence for costs and benefits. 
2(2) 
RESPONSE 
In response to the criticism that cost-benefit analysis cannot 
claim to be purely technical and free of bias, one must look 
"realistically" at the world in which it exists. A view of anything is 
taken from a perspective, every perspective is incomplete, somehow 
limited. Decisions must be made, and in some reasonable space of time to 
retain their desired efficacy. Necessarily then, in the "real world," 
there will be a lacuna in the perfect information, and the show will go 
on. As regards the bias of the analyst, the danger of abuse is 
recognized: the classic line runs (addressing the economist>, "what's 
two plus two?" and the reply, "what would you like it to be?" There are 
two reasons for error in the conduct of cost-benefit analysis: that of 
ordinary mistakes the calculations, and that of actual faults in the 
whole undertaking. All decision-making apparati are susceptible to those 
with intent to deceive. 
The correct identification of what are the costs and benefits has 
been called an art. It is hoped that in a democratic system there would 
be various information inputs so as to construct a best approximation of 
what is to be sought or augmented (positive, benefits> and what is to be 
avoided or diminished (negative, costs>. 
The issue of minority rights does remain unaddressed by 
cost-benefit analysis itself. It is hoped that other measures will be 
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taken, that the excuse of Potential <Pareto) Improvement will not shield 
the decision-making authorities from their responsibility to the whole 
and not merely the larger (more vocal, powerful, etc.). A possible 
avenue might be attention to the societal concern of distributive 
justice. 
The problem of uncertainty is in part accepted as a realistic 
information lack. The multi tude, it has been observed, tend to be 
present-oriented. Market prices may not be ideal for there is no perfect 
competition which acts to set them, but they are representative of a 
recognized value, and are therefore of significance in calculations. 
Quantification is a controversial point, but it serves in context. 
Utilizing a common denominator <e.g., dollars> enables comparison and 
simplification of variables. Not everything can be converted, but what 
cannot is listed for the decision-maker to take into consideration. 
The concern of government crowding-out effects can be anticipated, 
perhaps, by a knowledge of the condition of the economy. There will be 
lags in execution. Some economic theorists hold that government policy 
actions will· have no effect, due to compensatory activity in the private 
sector. 
Cost-benefit analysis reduces the variables in a question, making 
the decision more clear. It is a means of consolidating information so 
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as to make the information more manageable. It is thought that 
utilization of cost-benefit analysis is an improvement over the "square 
one" image of a listing of all the factors that are to be considered in 
the decision. That first picture is more highly prone to all of the 
weaknesses cited against cost-benefit analysis, but to a (perniciously) 
worse degree. It does not advertise itself as a political or moral 
agent; rather, it is a technique to be used responsibly by 
decision-making agents. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In Samuel Scheffler's book The Rejection of Consequential ism 
<Clarendon, 1984), he quotes Bernard Williams in criticism of classical 
utilitarianism, that "the da~ cannot be too far off in which we hear no more 
of it." Scheffler's next paragraph opens with "and ~et the da~ refuses to 
come ••• "pp3,4. He extends his suggestion as to wh~ utilitarianism is still 
around, what sorts of plausibi 1 i ties it holds which compensate tor its 
failings. Recall the Biblical star~ of Gamaliel <Acts 5:34-9) who is asked 
to do something about those new Christian folks. He sagely replies that he 
will do nothing: if the new church is of human construction, it will fall of 
its inherent imperfections; it of the design of God, then it wi 11 resist 
eternally an~ attacks. Perhaps there is too great a liberty taken in this 
metaphorical extension, but thoughts are provoked. As the criticisms of of 
utilitarianism are extrapolated, so too can the rebuttals of those 
criticisms serve in support of cost-benefit analysis. 
A good question to ask after the criticisms listed above is (in 
classic reductio ad absurdum), "suppose these difficulties find cost-benefit 
analysis unfit to carry any freight then what?" What sorts of 
alternatives are available, feasible, viable? A venture would be to say "not 
much of anything." In good tyrannical style, in place of public agencies, 
there could be a dictator who chooses courses of action with his own 
interest patently at the center. Easily in mind the example of the Somoza 
famil~ which helped the donations for the recovery from the 1975 earthquake 
in Nicaragua find their way into the vacation fund .••• 
- ---- - --- ----------------
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It is of interest to note that the passerby, without the Ph. D. in 
environmental science or whatever, upon learning ot two policy proposals 
would "rationally" select the one that weighed out the best, that produced 
the most tor the money and energy invested; without drawing on "other 
considerations." Part of the advocation of a process as e:·:haust i ve as 
cost-benefit analysis is due to the danger ot error in first impression 
decisions made in ignorance. 
Emily Dickinson recognized how "much madness" (as judged by the 
general public) could make "divinest sense" -- if the eye that perceived was 
a discerning one. In support of cost-benefit analysis is the hope that the 
additional apprehension of the problem and its situation by the more 
discerning eye would be to the greater benefit of the general p~blic and the 
society that contained it. That discerning eye could overcome some of the 
more crippling criticisms and limitations brought forward and discussed 
here. 
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